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) 
) 
) 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
APPELLANT'S BRI 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Nature of the Case 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jose Guadalupe Perez-Jungo asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the 
opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 43 (Ct. App. 2014) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the district court's order denying 
Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress, is in conflict with previous decisions of this Court 
and the United States Supreme Court, as well as with its own precedent, in that it held 
that an officer does not need to articulate a reasonable suspicion of any particular 
1 
criminal activity before engaging in a prolonged investigative detention; he need only 
have an non-specific belief that some crime is Further, the Court of Appeals 
held that a fact that was part of the totality of the circumstances bearing on the 
reasonable suspicion analysis, and actually considered and included by the district court 
its decision, could not be discussed on appeal because of the mistaken belief that the 
fact was not argued below and was, therefore, not preserved for appeal. 
If review is granted, Mr. Perez-Jungo requests that this Court reverse the district 
court's order denying his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Perez-Jungo asserts that the district 
court erred in denying his Motion to ppress because his prolonged detention and the 
subsequent of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Trooper Marquez of the Idaho State Police saw a truck parked to the side of a 
two-lane road in the middle of the night. (Tr., p.8, Ls.1 0-15, p.11, Ls.13-24.)1 The road 
was gravel with no divider markers and had borrow pits on both sides of the gravel. 
(Tr., p.11, Ls.19-25, p.12, Ls.1-9.) The truck was pulled to the edge of the gravel. 
(Tr., p.11, Ls.6-24; Exhibit 12.) Trooper Marquez testified at the hearing on the Motion 
to Suppress that he thought the vehicle might be abandoned or that someone might 
need help. (Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.24.) He turned on his emergency lights and his 
spotlight, which he trained on the driver's side mirror. (Tr., p.15, Ls.2-7.) Trooper 
Marquez explained that he activated his emergency lights for officer safety because he 
wanted to let people know he was a police officer. (Tr., p.15, Ls.S-25.) Trooper 
1 All transcript citations refer to the transcript of the Motion to Suppress hearing held on 
January 29, 2013, unless otherwise indicated. 
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testified that thought the truck might involved in 
"vandalisms or thefts" that had occurred in the area r to or that 
truck may have been stolen. (Tr., p.14, Ls.1-5, p.40, Ls.14-25.) 
Trooper Marquez approached the passenger-side window and saw Mr. Perez-
Jungo sitting in the driver's (Tr., p.19, Ls.22-24.) Trooper Marquez knocked on 
the window. (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Perez-Jungo was attempting to roll down the 
window when Trooper Marquez opened the passenger door. (Tr., p.20, Ls.15-21.) 
Trooper Marquez testified that he opened the passenger door because he "just wanted 
know what was going on and why [Mr. Perez-Jungo] was out there to make sure he 
need assistance." (Tr., p.20, Ls.1 1.) 
Trooper that, after he opened door, he saw a figurine of 
Muerte2 mounted on the dashboard. (Tr., p.20, L.22 p.21, L.1 0.) He also 
testified that Mr. Perez-Jungo's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. (Tr., p.22, Ls.?-10.) 
Trooper Marquez asked Mr. Perez-Jungo what he was doing and Mr. Perez-Jungo 
explained that he was waiting for someone who was going to talk to him about 
employment. (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-15.) Trooper Marquez asked if he had been drinking and 
Mr. Perez-Jungo said he had not. (Tr., p.42, Ls.S-12.) Trooper Marquez then asked for 
Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and registration, which he took back to his patrol car. 
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"Santa Muerte is a religious figure who receives petitions for love, luck, and protection. 
This saint is frequently dressed as the Grim Reaper with a scythe and scales. Grim 
Reaper statues are made in red, white, green and black - for love, luck, financial 
success and protection. Offerings to Santa Muerte include roses and tequila. Public 
shrines to Santa Muerte are adorned with red roses, cigars, and bottles of tequila. 
Throughout Mexico, and in parts of the United States (especially in Mexican immigrant 
communities), Santa Muerte prayer cards, medals, and candles are made and routinely 
sold to the public." (Exhibit 11.) 
3 
Ls.9-10.) Trooper ran the license plate for the truck through 
d and determined the truck was not . (Tr., p.41, Ls.1 
While he continued to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo, Trooper Marquez asked dispatch 
send a drug detection dog and requested a second patrol unit (Tr., p.24, Ls.13-21.) 
When he was told by dispatch that a drug dog would take at least 20 minutes to arrive, 
Trooper Marquez said that he "didn't have enough time" to wait for the dog. (Exhibit 12, 
at 10:21 ). However, while still holding Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and registration, 
Trooper Marquez waited 10 or 15 minutes for another unit to arrive. (Tr., p.27, Ls.4-8.) 
Three additional units arrived and Trooper Marquez ordered Mr. Perez-Jungo out of his 
truck. (Tr., p.44, Ls.20-22, p.25, Ls.19-23.) Trooper Marquez spoke with his sergeant 
and with the other officers and told them that the reason for the detention was that 
"obviously something was not right." (Tr., p.47, Ls.15-19.) At no point did Trooper 
Marquez tell any of the other officers that he was investigating Mr. Perez-Jungo for 
driving under the influence or for drug trafficking. (Tr., p.47, Ls.3-14.) 
Trooper Marquez placed Mr. Perez-Jungo in front of his patrol car and 
questioned him about prior drug use. (Tr., p.27, Ls.13-25, p.28, Ls.1-6.) Mr. Perez-
Jungo was never asked to perform any sobriety tests or answer any questions that 
would be used to evaluate a person for driving under the influence. (Tr., p.44, Ls.S-19.) 
Meanwhile, other officers shined their flashlights into the windows of Mr. Perez-Jungo's 
truck. (Tr., p.27, Ls.21-22, p.48, Ls.20-24.) Following this examination of the interior of 
Mr. Perez-Jungo's truck, Deputy Kingsland told Trooper Marquez that he saw a baggie 
with an orange substance in it on the dashboard and a light bulb that appeared to be 
hollowed out in the netting behind the passenger seat, which he testified can be used as 
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a smoking to (Tr., Ls.7-1 p.57, 1 1 ) Trooper 
Marquez then truck. (Preliminary Hearing 11/21/12, p.13, 
Ls.17-24.) Trooper Marquez scraped the light bulb and tested the residue using a NIK 
test, which returned a presumptive positive result for cocaine. (Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript 11/21/1 p.14, Ls.1-23.) Trooper Marquez then found a baggie in the pocket 
of a jacket on the passenger seat containing a substance that he also tested, which 
returned a presumptive positive result for cocaine and amphetamine. (Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript 11/21/12, p.16, Ls.18-25, p.17, Ls.1 
Mr. Perez-Jungo was charged with one count of possession of cocaine, but the 
information was to the substance methamphetamine, and one 
misdemeanor count of possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.52-53, 155-156.) 
Mr. Perez-Jungo filed a Motion to Suppress arguing that the detention, search, and 
interrogation violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. (R., pp.67-80.) 
In his Motion to Suppress, Mr. Perez-Jungo argued, among other things, that 
reasonable suspicion did not exist that would support Trooper Marquez's investigative 
detention. (R., p.76.) At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Trooper Marquez 
testified that the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine was a basis for his suspicions. 
(Tr., p.22, Ls.16-21.) Defense counsel specifically cross-examined Deputy Kingsland 
about the religious significance of Santa Muerte. (Tr., p.59, L.20 - p.60, L.6.) A 
photograph of the Santa Muerte figurine was admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 
5. (R., p.120.) 
The district court denied, in part, Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress. 
(R., pp.116-139.) The district court found that Trooper Marquez had "objective and 
5 
engage in impaired driving or drug trafficking." , p.135.) The district court further 
stated that, "Marquez observed bloodshot and glassy eyes which indicate potential drug 
or alcohol impairment" and that, "Marquez also observed the Santa Muerte statue which 
is, as Marquez has learned through drug interdiction training, a common patron saint to 
drug traffickers." (R., p.134.) Finally, the district court cited two federal court cases 
where the image of Santa Muerte has been "linked to drug trafficking or criminal 
activity." (R., p.135.) The district court concluded that Trooper Marquez had 
reasonable suspicion to suspect that Mr. Perez-Jungo was "driving while impaired 
and/or had drugs in the vehicle" because: 
1. Mr. Perez-Jungo's eyes were bloodshot and glassy 
Mr. Perez-Jungo was parked in a remote area late at night and explained 
he was waiting to speak with someone about a job 
3. The presence of the Santa Muerte figurine on the dashboard 
(R., p.135.) 
Mr. Perez-Jungo entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of 
methamphetamine, preserving the ability to challenge the district court's order denying 
his Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.172-178.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and 
placed Mr. Perez-Jungo on probation. (R., pp.170-171.) Mr. Perez-Jungo appealed 
from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.193-194.) 
On appeal, Mr. Perez-Jungo argued that Trooper Marquez did not have 
reasonable suspicion to continue to detain him because the factors cited by the district 
court- bloodshot and glassy eyes, time of night and remote location, and the Santa 
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Muerte figurine did not amount to suspicion of driving u the influence 
or drug trafficking. (See generally Appellant's ) 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision denying Mr. 
Jungo's Motion to Suppress. (Opinion, p.1 0.) The Court of Appeals held that the 
reasonable suspicion standard does not require suspicion of a specific crime and, 
therefore, Mr. Perez-Jungo could not argue that the facts of the case were not sufficient 
to provide reasonable suspicion of impaired driving or illegal drug activity separately. 
(Opinion, pp.6-7.) With this in mind, the Court of Appeals found that Trooper Marquez 
had a r~asonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo 
based on the same facts cited by the district court, including the of the 
Muerte figurine. (Opinion, p.8.) Finally, the Court of Appeals refused to consider 
Mr. Perez-Jungo's argument that the Santa Muerte figurine should not be used to 
support reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking because it claimed that the argument 
was not made below. (Opinion, p.8 n.?.) 
Mr. Perez-Jungo filed a timely petition for review following the issuance of the 
Opinion. 
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ISSUES 
1. the Idaho Supreme Court should grant review of the Idaho Court of 
Appeals' Opinion affirming the district court's denial of Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion 
to Suppress is in conflict with previous decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
Whether the district court's order denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress 
should be reversed because his prolonged detention and the subsequent search 
of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Should Grant Review Of The Idaho Court Of Appeals' 
Opinion Affirming The District Court's Denial Of Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion To Suppress 
Because It Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The United States Supreme Court, 
The Idaho Supreme Court, And The Idaho Court Of Appeals 
A. Introduction 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted 
only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the 
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the 
Supreme Court. I.A.R. 118(b ). Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five 
factors which must be considered in evaluating any petition for review: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not yet 
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from 
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior 
decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the 
Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; and, 
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.A.R. 118(b). In this case, Mr. Perez-Jungo contends that there are special and 
important reasons for review to be granted because the Court of Appeals' decision is in 
contravention of United States Supreme Court, Idaho Supreme Court, and Idaho Court 
of Appeals precedent. I.A.R. 118(b )(2)-(3). Therefore, this Court should exercise its 
review authority in this case. 
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B. The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Erroneously Held That Police Officers May Detain 
A Suspect VVhen The Officers Do Not Have Particularized Suspicion Of Criminal 
Activity 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case ignored the requirement that the 
suspicion must be particularized in order to amount to reasonable suspicion. The 
Fourth Amendment to the United <.:t"t"" Constitution provides: "The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CaNST. amend IV. The Fourth 
Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,524 (1986). 
The Idaho Constitution provides similar protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. IDAHO CaNST. Art. I,§ 17; State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,471 (2001). 
A unanimous United Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a 
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment. The State can only 
overcome that presumption by demonstrating that one of the exceptional, well-
established, and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable to 
the facts. /d. at 390-91; see also State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding 
the same standard applies to Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution). 
An investigative detention is constitutionally permissible based upon reasonable 
suspicion, derived from specific articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed 
or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Reasonable 
suspicion must be more than a hunch or an unparticularized suspicion of criminal 
activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59 (Ct. App. 2011 ). In 
10 
to be a "particularized" 
(1) the 
the officer's suspicion must satisfy two 
must be based on the totality of the 
circumstances, and (2) the must yield a particularized suspicion that the 
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. State v. Swindle, 148 
Idaho 61, 64 (Ct. App. 2009). 
The Court of Appeals held that Trooper Marquez did not have to have a 
particularized suspicion of either driving under the influence or drug trafficking, only that 
he had to have reasonable suspicion that Mr. Perez-Jungo was involved in some 
criminal activity. (Opinion, pp.6-7.) The Court of Appeals also held that it was 
unnecessary to evaluate separately whether Trooper Marquez had reasonable 
suspicion to support t1is investigation for driving under the influence or for trafficking 
drugs. (Opinion, p.6.) In doing so, the Court of Appeals ignored the requirement that a 
suspicion must be particularized in order to amount to reasonable suspicion. While the 
Court of Appeals is correct that reasonable suspicion does not require suspicion of a 
specific crime, it does require enough facts to make the suspicion particularized. Terry, 
supra, 392 U.S. at 22. It logically follows that, if there are not enough facts to support 
suspicion of any criminal activity - in this case, DUI or drug trafficking - then the 
suspicion is merely a hunch. Thus, an officer must be able to show some grouping of 
facts that supports some criminal activity in order to detain a citizen to conduct an 
investigation. 
Here, Trooper Marquez numerous hunches. First, based on the location of the 
vehicle and the time of night, he had a hunch that the vehicle might be stolen or 
abandoned. (Tr., p.13, L.24- p.14, L.24.) Also based on the location and time of night, 
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Trooper Marquez had a hunch that the vehicle might be involved in vandalism or theft of 
radio towers. (Tr., p.1 Ls.1 p.40, 1 ) Based on Mr. Perez~Jungo's red 
glassy and the location and time of night, Trooper Marquez had a hunch that 
Mr. Perez-Jungo might be under the influence of alcohol. (Tr., p.22, Ls.9-21.) Then, 
based on the location and of night, and the Santa figurine, Trooper 
Marquez had a hunch that Mr. Perez-Jungo was a drug trafficker. (Tr., p.22, Ls.9-21.) 
Basically, as Trooper Marquez himself stated, "obviously something was not right." 
(Tr., p.47, Ls.15-19.) 
Clearly, Trooper Marquez did not have to provide facts that supported every 
element of driving under the influence or drug trafficking. 
claim that he detained Mr. Perez-Jungo for driving under 
trafficking, then he must be able to point to facts that are 
if he is going to 
influence or drug 
to one of those 
particular offenses and those facts must be enough to elevate a hunch to a reasonable 
suspicion of some criminal activity. Otherwise, officers would satisfy the reasonable 
suspicion requirement by listing random factors that could be related to one or more 
offenses and stating, "I suspected that criminal activity was afoot." The Fourth 
Amendment clearly requires more. 
Because the Opinion does not require that an officer have a particularized 
suspicion in order to conduct an investigation, it is contradictory to established 
precedent. Therefore, this Court should exercise its review authority in this case. 
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C. 
District Court As A Basis For Its Decision Is Not Preserved For Appeal If It Was 
Not Argued By Counsel Below 
The Court of Appeals refused to consider Mr. Perez-Jungo's argument that the 
Santa Muerte figurine should hold little, if any weight, in a reasonable suspicion 
determination for drug trafficking because it claimed that the argument was not made by 
defense counsel below. (Opinion, p.8, fn. 7.) This position is clearly in conflict with prior 
decisions of this Court. First, the issue to be preserved is whether or not Trooper 
Marquez had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo. This issue was clearly 
argued below by both parties. (See generally Tr.) The significance of the figurine is not 
an "issue," it is a fact. This fact was also addressed at the Motion to hearing. 
Trooper Marquez testified that the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine was a basis for 
his suspicions. (Tr., p.22, Ls.16-21.) At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, 
defense counsel specifically cross-examined Deputy Kingsland about the religious 
significance of Santa Muerte. (Tr., p.59, L.20 - p.60, L.6.) A photograph of the Santa 
Muerte figurine was admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 5. (R., p.120.) 
Further, even if each particular fact of a case must be independently preserved, 
the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine falls into a clearly stated exception because 
the district court found that the Santa Muerte figurine was a basis for reasonable 
suspicion. See McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397 (2003) ("To properly raise an 
issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the court below or the issue 
must have been raised in the court below, an issue cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal"); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) ("An exception to this rule [that 
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not raised below cannot be on appeal], been applied this 
rt when the was argued to or decided by the trial court.") 
Specifically, the district court stated in its decision that, "Marquez also observed 
the Santa Muerte statue which is, as Marquez has learned through drug interdiction 
training, a common patron saint to drug traffickers." (R., p.134.) The district court then 
cited two federal court cases where the image of Santa Muerte has been "linked to drug 
trafficking or criminal activity." (R., p.135.) The district court concluded that Trooper 
Marquez had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Perez-Jungo was "driving while impaired 
and/or had drugs in the vehicle" because Mr. Perez-Jungo's eyes were bloodshot and 
Mr. Perez-Jungo was parked in a remote area at night and explained that he 
was waiting to speak with someone about a job, and a Santa Muerte figurine was on the 
dashboard. (R., p.135.) 
Defense counsel below argued that Trooper Marquez did not have reasonable 
suspicion to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo and the district court determined that the Trooper 
Marquez did have reasonable suspicion based, in part, on the presence of the Santa 
Muerte figurine. The issue of whether there was reasonable suspicion and the fact that 
the Santa Muerte figurine existed were preserved. The Court of Appeals' Opinion is 
clearly contradictory to Idaho Supreme Court precedent and, therefore, this Court 
should exercise its review authority in this case. 
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II. 
Reversed Because His Prolonged Detention And The Subsequent Search Of His 
Vehicle Violated His Fourth Amendment Rights 
A Introduction 
The district court erred in denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress 
because Mr. Perez-Jungo's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police officers 
prolonged their detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo. The State failed to meet its burden of 
showing that Trooper Marquez had reasonable suspicion to continue to detain 
Mr. Perez-Jungo after Trooper Marquez performed a welfare check. As such, the 
district denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress should be reversed. 
B. 
In State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals 
articulated the following standard of review for an appeal from a motion to suppress: 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely 
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. At 
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. 
/d. at 302 (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion To Suppress 
Because His Detention Was Illegally Prolonged And, Therefore, Any Evidence 
Collected Must Be Suppressed As Fruit Of Illegal Government Activity 
As noted above, a warrantless search or seizure is presumptively a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment unless the government can prove that the search and seizure 
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within a the warrant requirement or was otherwise 
reasonable under circumstance. U Const. amend. IV; Coolidge v. New 
Nampshire, 403 U 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129 
(Ct. App. 2002); State v. Martinez, 1 Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996). If the 
government fails to this burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal 
search, including later~discovered evidence derived from the original illegal search, is 
inadmissible in court. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219 (1999). 
1. 
Jungo After He Completed His Community Caretaking Role 
Trooper Mr. Perez~Jungo when activated his emergency 
lights and pulled up behind him. A person is seized or detained within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would 
have believed he or she was no longer free to leave. State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 
866 (Ct. App. 1995). Although a detention may not have been intended by Trooper 
Marquez at this point, a detention occurred because Mr. Perez-Jungo was not free to 
leave. See I.C. § 49-1404 (prohibiting fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer 
when signaled to stop by the officer's emergency lights and/or siren); Maddox, supra, 
137 Idaho at 824; State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 692 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an 
officer activating emergency lights while performing a caretaking function constitutes a 
de facto detention). Further, even if Trooper Marquez's use of his emergency lights did 
not constitute a seizure, a seizure certainly occurred when Trooper Marquez took and 
retained Mr. Perez-Jungo's driver's license and registration since Mr. Perez-Jungo 
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could not drive without 
v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 
v. Goodwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493 (1991 ); 
(Ct. App. 1991 ). 
Although the initial detention was justified under Trooper Marquez's community 
caretaking function, the detention became illegal because Trooper Marquez continued 
to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo after his community caretaking role was complete. 
The community caretaking function arises from the duty of police officers to help citizens 
in need of assistance and is totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Maddox, supra, 
137 Idaho at 824. The community caretaking function only justifies a detention if there 
is a present need for Cutler, supra, 143 Idaho at 303. 
Here, Trooper testified that, upon seeing the truck, he was: (1) 
concerned that the truck was abandoned; (2) concerned that someone might need help; 
(3) concerned that the vehicle was stolen; and (4) concerned that the truck might be 
involved in thefts or vandalisms that occurred in the area. (Tr., p.40, Ls.14-25.) In order 
to justify the detention of a citizen under the community caretaking exception, the officer 
must have a genuine and warranted concern rather than simply the officer's curiosity, an 
unsubstantiated suspicion of criminal activity, or an unwarranted concern that help 
might be needed. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,844 (2004); Maddox, supra, 137 Idaho 
at 824-25. Clearly, only the first two concerns identified by Trooper Marquez fall under 
the community caretaking function as defined by the Idaho Supreme Court in Page. 
The other two concerns are criminal in nature and require reasonable suspicion to 
justify a detention. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., 1, 21 (1968). As discussed in 
subsection (C)(2), reasonable suspicion did not exist to support Trooper Marquez's 
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hunches that the truck was stolen or that it was involved in 
towers. 
vandalism of radio 
Therefore, Trooper Marquez's initial detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo can only be 
justified by the community caretaking function, the scope of which is limited. After 
shining his spotlight on the truck, Trooper Marquez could clearly see that there was a 
person in the driver's seat, immediately dispelling any concern that the truck was 
abandoned. (Tr., p.41, Ls.1 ) Upon making contact with Mr. Perez-Jungo, Trooper 
Marquez questioned Mr. Perez-Jungo about what he was doing and Mr. Perez-Jungo 
explained that he was waiting for a friend to talk to about a job. (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-15.) At 
that point, both of Trooper Marquez's caretaking concerns had addressed; the 
truck was not abandoned, and Perez-Jungo did not need help. 
Trooper Marquez then requested Mr. Perez-Jungo's and registration. 
Although this action lengthened Mr. Perez-Jungo's detention, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has held that, even when an officer is acting in a community caretaking capacity and 
has determined that the driver does not need assistance, he may request and run a 
status check on the person's driver's license. Goodwin, supra, 121 Idaho at 494-95. 
Therefore, this action was not outside the boundaries of the community caretaking 
exception. However, after running Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and registration through 
dispatch and determining that there were no issues, Trooper Marquez did not return the 
license and registration and allow Mr. Perez-Jungo to leave, as was required at the 
conclusion of his community caretaking duties. Rather, Trooper Marquez continued to 
detain Mr. Perez-Jungo for at least 10 minutes while he waited for back-up units, and 
then proceeded to order Mr. Perez-Jungo out of his car. (Tr., p.25, Ls.5-12, 21-23.) 
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the license and registration came clear, no further 
cause to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo and no reason to him out of his car. This 
constituted an illegal detention that was not justified by the community caretaker 
exception. 
2. Trooper Marquez Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Continue To 
Detain Mr. Perez-Jungo 
An investigative detention is constitutionally permissible based upon reasonable 
suspicion, derived from specific articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed 
or is about to commit a crime. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21; v. Salata, 137 Idaho 
(Ct. App. 2001 ). Although the required information leading to formation of 
suspicion in the mind of the police officer is less than the information 
required to form probable cause, it still "must be more than mere speculation or a hunch 
on the part of the police officer." State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the stop, and the "whole picture must yield a particularized 
and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or has been 
engaged in wrongdoing." State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Here, Trooper Marquez testified to four possible suspicions of criminal activity: 
(1) The truck Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving was stolen; (2) Mr. Perez-Jungo was 
somehow involved in the vandalisms or thefts involving radio towers that had occurred 
in the area four to six weeks prior; (3) Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol; and (3) Mr. Perez-Jungo was trafficking narcotics. None of these 
suspicions were supported by specific, articulable facts. 
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a. 
Mr. Perez-Jungo's Truck Was Stolen 
Trooper Marquez testified that he was initiaily concerned that Perez-Jungo's 
truck was stolen. (Tr., p.40, Ls.24-25.) Trooper Marquez did not provide a single fact 
supporting this hunch. However, upon running Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and 
registration through dispatch and determining that the truck was, in fact, not stolen, his 
unsubstantiated concern was immediately dispelled. (Tr., p.41, Ls.18-22.) Therefore, 
Trooper Marquez had no reason to continue the detention to investigate whether the 
truck was stolen. 
b. 
Towers 
Trooper Marquez did not articulate a single reason why he suspected that 
Mr. Perez-Jungo was involved in the vandalism or thefts of radio towers. Trooper 
Marquez testified that he received an email in the last four or six weeks stating that 
there had been prior vandalisms of radio towers in the area. (Tr., p.9, 
Ls.S-11.) However, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the rural, gravel 
road where Mr. Perez-Jungo was parked is, or ever was, a "high crime" area. Further, 
even if the location were a high crime area, mere presence in a high crime area is not 
enough to support a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 
Illinois v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); see also State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho 
1007, 1010 (1989) (holding that a driver who hesitates at a stop sign for a longer period 
than usual, in the middle of the night, in an area where recent burglaries had taken 
place, does not rise to the articulable level of suspicion necessary for a seizure). As the 
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Idaho Supreme Court stated in McAfee, 
are driving night and on a 
/d. at 1009. 
The fact that a crime may have occurred in the area more than a month prior is 
not grounds for detaining a person who happens to be parked in that area. Such a rule 
would allow officers to stop every single person on the road for months after a crime 
occurs. Here, there was no evidence tying Mr. Perez-Jungo to the vanda!isms or thefts 
of the radio towers. There was no indication that a suspect or vehicle description 
existed or that it matched Mr. Perez-Jungo or his truck. There were no statements, tips, 
photos, or any other evidence implicating Mr. Perez-Jungo. Therefore, Trooper 
Marquez's hunch was entirely unsubstantiated and he did not have a reasonable 
suspicion that would justify an investigation of theft or vandalism. 
c. Trooper Marquez Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion That 
Mr. Perez-Jungo Was Driving Under The Influence 
Reasonable suspicion should be evaluated by considering the totality of the 
information known to the officer at the time. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 
(1981 ). Trooper Marquez testified that he suspected that Mr. Perez-Jungo might be 
driving under the influence because his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. (Tr., p.22, 
Ls.19-21.) Although bloodshot and glassy eyes may be considered in the totality of the 
circumstances in evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists, no reported case has 
ever held that bloodshot and glassy eyes, alone, constitutes a reasonable suspicion of 
driving under the influence. In Idaho, every case involving bloodshot and glassy eyes 
as reasonable suspicion identifies some other evidence of alcohol or drug use. See, 
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v. 149 Idaho 361, 364 (Ct. App. 201 0) (detention was reasonable 
had bloodshot and glassy eyes, reddening the conjunctiva of his 
and eyelid tremors); State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140 (Ct. App. 
(probable cause existed to arrest defendant who smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her 
speech, had glassy and bloodshot eyes, and seemed confused); State v. Johnson, 137 
Idaho 656, 658-60 (Ct. App. 2002) (further detention of defendant was reasonable when 
defendant exhibited extreme nervousness, smelled like alcohol, admitted to drinking 
alcohol, and had dilated and bloodshot eyes); State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 605 
(Ct. App. 1 993) (reasonable suspicion existed to detain defendant when defendant had 
bloodshot eyes, admitted to consuming alcohol, and slurred her speech). 
jurisdictions have found that bloodshot eyes alone are not enough to establish 
reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed. e.g., Ferris v. State, 735 
A.2d 491 (Md. 1999); State v. Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars and No/100 in 
U.S. Currency, 136 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). 
Further, no additional factors existed that would support reasonable suspicion 
that Mr. Perez-Jungo was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In addition to 
observing Mr. Perez-Jungo eyes, Trooper Marquez stated that he was aware of the time 
of night, the remote location, the "odd hours to be talking to someone about 
employment," and the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine. (Tr., p.23, Ls.13-25, p.22, 
Ls.16-21.) These observations do not amount to reasonable suspicion to believe that 
Mr. Perez-Jungo was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. As discussed above, the 
location where Mr. Perez-Jungo was parked was not a high crime area and simply 
driving or parking late at night is not, by itself, suspicious. Similarly, Mr. Perez-Jungo's 
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for why he was there, that he was meeting a friend to discuss a job, was not 
contradicted. Although Marquez was not required to believe Mr. Perez-Ju 
explanation, the explanation itself was forthright and reasonable. See, contra, State v. 
Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916 (2001) (co-travelers' conflicting stories about their 
destination and the purpose of their trip supported reasonable suspicion). Finally, the 
presence of a Santa Muerte figurine, discussed in subsection (C)(2)(d), has no relation 
to driving under the influence and should not be considered as reasonable suspicion to 
investigate a person for DUI. 
Mr. Perez-Jungo asserts that none of the factors identified by Trooper Marquez, 
even taken together, support reasonable suspicion that a person is driving under 
influence for glassy eyes. Mr. Perez-Jungo further that 
bloodshot and glassy eyes, alone, are not enough to establish reasonable suspicion 
that an individual is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. There are numerous other 
causes for bloodshot and glassy eyes. Here, Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving late at night 
and tiredness often causes bloodshot and glassy eyes. If this factor, alone, is sufficient 
to create reasonable suspicion, any tired driver or person suffering from allergies will be 
subject to detention for an investigation into the possibility they are under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol. 
Further, even if this Court were to determine that bloodshot and glassy eyes are 
sufficient, alone, to justify a detention and investigation for driving under the influence, 
Trooper Marquez went beyond the scope of the investigation and illegally prolonged his 
detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo because he waited for a drug dog to arrive, rather than 
conduct a DUI investigation. (Tr., p.24, Ls.9-15, p.25, Ls.1-12.) Where a person is 
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of detention must carefully tailored to its underlying justification. 
460 U 491 , 500 ( 1983 ). An investigative detention "must be 
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." 
ld; see also Goodwin, supra, 121 Idaho at 501. Further, the investigative methods 
employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel 
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. /d. In a DUI investigation, field sobriety 
are the least intrusive means of investigation. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 
482 (Ct. App. 1999). Since a drug dog has no relation to a DUI investigation, Trooper 
Marquez would only be able to justify delay if he also had a reasonable suspicion 
Mr. Perez-Jungo was trafficking drugs. 
d. 
Trooper Marquez testified that he suspected that Mr. Perez-Jungo might be 
trafficking drugs. The reasons that Trooper Marquez gave to support this hunch were 
the same as those he gave to support his hunch that Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving 
under the influence, namely the time of night, the remote location, the "odd hours to be 
talking to someone about employment," and the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine. 
(Tr., p.23, Ls.13-25, p.22, Ls.16-21.) As discussed above, the first three factors do not 
create reasonable suspicion of any crime, and certainly not drug trafficking. The only 
other factor Trooper Marquez identified was the presence of a Santa Muerte figurine on 
the dashboard, which he testified was associated with drug traffickers. (Tr., p.21, Ls.1-
4.) 
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to if to to the 
figurines in drug trafficking cases. courts that 
add these saints and other folk heroes, commonly Malverde and Santa 
done so in the of testimony. United States v. 
Pena (8th Cir. 2009). courts have refused to 
consider the presence of such saints at all, citing constitutional concerns. See e.g. 
State v. La Rosa, 208 P.3d 1012, 1018 n (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to consider 
the observation of a ,Jesus Malverde medallion in its reasonable suspicion calculus, 
officer's "detailed testimony" about the training and he received 
onr·-~rcu• by poor people in symbolism, is also 
Latin and "permitting officials to conduct otherwise unlawful searches on 
a medallion that supposedly has significance only to Hispanics the same kind of 
serious constitutional concerns as other forms of profiling"). 
Although sorne courts have found that the presence of a Santa Muerte or Jesus 
Malverde statue or image can be a factor in a reasonable suspicion determination, the 
officers in every one of those cases had significant particularized suspicion beyond the 
presence of the saints. See, e.g., Pena-Ponce, supra, 588 F.3d. at 584 (officers had 
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking when suspect stalled while answering 
questions, the passenger in the car showed excessive nervousness, the suspect and 
the passenger had conflicting stories about where they had been, there were multiple 
cell phones in the truck and the passenger tried to kick one of the phones out of view, 
and there was a Santa Muerte figurine on the dashboard); United States v. Lopez-
Gutierrez, 334 Fed. Appx. 880 (1Oth Cir. 2009) (officers had reasonable suspicion when 
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they scarring on the 
hide 
three cells phones, one small su 
had spent more than a in 
dashboard and around the 
icating 
of 
neck); State v. Alvarez, 147 P.3d 
they 
on the 
(Utah 
2006) (officers had reasonable suspicion when they observed the suspect two 
short visits on consecutive days to condominiums known for drug dealing, tips had 
received about drug dealing in the condominiums, one of which was specific to the 
vehicle, and a Jesus Malverde medallion was present). 
Unlike clothing displaying or other direct drug Santa 
is a common Mexican icon. (See Exhibit 11.) While it is true that 
innocuous items may indicate drug or trafficking, such individually do 
not, without more, create reasonable suspicion. For example, a straw would not, 
without additional factors, amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. A straw 
is a common piece of drug paraphernalia, but it also has obvious ordinary uses. 
Similarly, a Santa Muerte figurine may indicate drug trafficking, but it may also indicate 
a popular religious symbol or simply an affinity for skeletons in robes. Here, Trooper 
Marquez did not have any evidence of drug trafficking beyond the presence of the 
Santa Muerte figurine and his hunch that "something isn't right." At the time that he 
detained Mr. Perez-Jungo, Trooper Marquez did not smell marijuana, see any residue 
or indication of drugs, or see anything that could be identified as drug paraphernalia. 
He merely saw a person parked at night in a rural area with a Santa Muerte figurine on 
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the dashboard. This is 
Amendment prohibits. 
speculation or hunch" 
In sum, Trooper Marquez's hunches ranged from driving under the influence 
trafficking narcotics to vandalizing radio Not a single one of these hu was 
supported by reasonable suspicion, and multiple unsubstantiated hunches do not 
particularized suspicion of criminal activity. Contrary to the district court's ultimate 
finding, the State failed to provide evidence of reasonable articulable suspicion for 
Trooper Marquez to continue to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo and, therefore, all evidence 
obtained as a result of the prolonged detention must be suppressed. 
Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental Activi!Y 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only 
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura, supra, 468 U.S. at 
815; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 
245, 249 (1990). The test is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, 
the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that 
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint." Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 488. Suppression is required if "the evidence 
sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the government's 
unconstitutional conduct." State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Trooper Marquez illegally prolonged his detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo after he 
had performed his caretaking function. Had Mr. Perez-Jungo detention not been 
illegally prolonged the evidence located in the vehicle would not have been discovered. 
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failed to its burden of showing that 
1ecrea after the impermissible 
the illegal police activity. 
CONCLUSION 
must 
Mr. Perez-Jungo respectfully requests that this Court 
is untainted; 
as it of 
review authority 
in this case. On review, he requests that this Court reverse the district court's decision 
denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress, and remand the case to the district 
court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 241h day of June, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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